In the third quarter (Q3) of 2026 (July through September), analysis of publicly disclosed victim data and ransomware groups’ postings on data leak sites (DLS) identified 1,266 ransomware incidents affecting industrial organizations worldwide, an 11% increase over the 1,140 incidents recorded in Q2.
Manufacturing accounted for the largest share, with 876 incidents (69%), followed by engineering firms/integrators supporting the operational technology (OT) ecosystem, with 116 incidents, and transportation and logistics, with 105 incidents. The U.S. remained the most affected country with 473 incidents (37% of the global total), Germany ranked second for the second consecutive quarter with 66, and India recorded the largest increase in Asia, rising from 15 to 38 incidents.
Qilin and The Gentlemen accounted for 362 incidents (29%), and the number of distinct ransomware brands claiming industrial victims rose from 70 to 99. Ransomware remained the most persistent and disruptive cyber threat to industrial organizations in Q3 2026, and its operational impact again came through the enterprise IT, enterprise resource planning (ERP), and virtualization systems that OT depends on.
A July ransomware attack on production-related systems at Fairlife, a Coca-Cola dairy subsidiary, suspended production at all four of its U.S. facilities for roughly 11 days. Argentine pipeline operator Oldelval reported that only administrative systems were affected in a July ransomware attack, and crude transport continued. In August, an unattributed cyberattack on medical device manufacturer Boston Scientific halted global manufacturing and shipping for about two weeks.
Ransomware operators continued to rely on a consistent set of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), including exploitation of edge devices and enterprise applications, the use of stolen credentials, and evasion of endpoint detection and response (EDR) systems. Critical flaws in VMware vCenter and JetBrains TeamCity were exploited within days of disclosure and later tied to ransomware operations. INC Ransom exploited SonicWall SMA 1000 vulnerabilities for initial access. Separately, public reporting in July 2026 linked the FortiBleed campaign, which harvested credentials from more than 86,000 FortiGate devices in June, to INC and Lynx operations. After claiming no industrial victims in Q2, Cl0p returned with mass exploitation of PTC Windchill and FlexPLM, claiming engineering and design data from manufacturers without employing encryption, maintaining the data theft trend observed across the ransomware ecosystem. Dragos observed no case in Q3 2026 in which a ransomware operator reached Stage 2 of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain or directly manipulated a control system. Dragos assesses with high confidence that ransomware will continue to impact industrial organizations globally, and that these intrusions can cascade into OT environments, producing operational downtime, precautionary shutdowns, loss of view, and safety risk even without any ICS-native capability. By examining victimology, sector concentration, observed TTPs, and real-world operational impacts, Dragos provides defenders with insight into the evolving ransomware threat to industrial organizations.
- Industrial ransomware activity grew again in Q3 2026 (July to September). Dragos identified 1,266 incidents, up from 1,140 in Q2 and 1,020 in Q1. Volume has climbed by roughly 120 incidents each quarter this year.
- Manufacturing was the most affected sector with 876 incidents (69%).
- ICS-related organizations (engineering firms, system integrators, and equipment manufacturers) accounted for the second-most-impacted sector, with 116 incidents, reflecting persistent industrial supply chain exposure.
- Transportation and logistics ranked third with 105 incidents.
- North America and Europe remained the most affected regions. The U.S. consistently ranks as the most impacted country by ransomware by a far margin (473 incidents in Q3, or 37% of all incidents). Germany remained the second most-affected country for the second consecutive quarter (68 in Q2, 66 in Q3). India recorded the largest increase in Asia, from 15 incidents in Q2 to 38 in Q3.
- Similar to previous quarters, a small number of ransomware groups accounted for a disproportionate share of activity, with Qilin and The Gentlemen responsible for the largest victim volumes in Q3.
- The extortion model continued to shift away from encryption toward data theft-only operations, and geopolitically influenced activity, including public reports of state-aligned adversaries operating behind ransomware branding.
This quarter’s ransomware activity against industrial organizations remained concentrated among a small number of established RaaS operations, even as the number of distinct brands claiming industrial victims rose from 70 to 99. Qilin and The Gentlemen accounted for 29% of incidents. The methods behind those claims changed little from prior quarters. Affiliates exploited internet-facing edge devices and enterprise applications within days of public disclosure, reused stolen and compromised VPN credentials, and exfiltrated data before, or in some cases in place of, deploying an encryptor. Cl0p returned to mass exploitation of enterprise software, this time targeting engineering and product design data held in PTC’s Windchill and FlexPLM platforms. In July 2026, South Korean authorities publicly linked the Gunra ransomware operation to a threat group they associate with the North Korean government.
Qilin
Qilin remained the most active ransomware brand targeting industrial organizations, a position it has held since March 2025, with 195 incidents in Q3, up from 140 in Q2. Its continued prominence reflects the scale of its affiliate network and its ability to use multiple access vectors. Arctic Wolf attributed several mid-2026 intrusions to multiple Qilin affiliates exploiting CVE-2026-0257, an authentication bypass in Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect. Affiliates exploited this vulnerability to open VPN sessions, then stole credentials from the local security authority subsystem service (LSASS) memory and the NTDS.dit database, moving laterally with PsExec and RDP, and exfiltrating data with Rclone and MEGA. While exploitation began in Q2, it is likely this vulnerability will continue to be abused until all exposed instances are patched. Additional reporting indicates that Qilin affiliates also adopted a custom Rust-based loader and a kernel-level EDR killer reportedly sold on criminal markets for about $2,000 (USD). In early October 2026, Japan extradited to Germany a 28-year-old Russian national who allegedly worked as a Qilin developer, following his arrest in Osaka in May under the German-led Operation ALBUS. German authorities have reportedly identified three more leading Qilin members believed to be in Russia. Dragos has yet to observe any impact on the Qilin network from this operation. Qilin continued posting victims at a steady pace through the quarter, and the arrest of a single developer is unlikely to slow an affiliate network of this size.
The Gentlemen
The Gentlemen claimed 167 industrial victims in Q3, its third consecutive quarterly increase, up from 125 in Q2 and 18 in Q4 2025. The group now ranks second only to Qilin in Dragos’ DLS data. Unit 42 assessed that the operators were likely former members of ArmCorp, a Qilin affiliate. Reporting indicates continued exploitation of FortiOS (CVE-2024-55591), Erlang/OTP SSH (CVE-2025-32433), and the Windows SMB client (CVE-2025-33073), along with abuse of the vulnerable ThrottleStop.sys driver (CVE-2025-7771) and a custom EDR killer named GentleKiller. The group also pushed its extortion past its direct victims. After South African firm MIP Holdings paid The Gentlemen to delete data stolen in June, the group began listing MIP’s clients on its leak site in Q3 to extort them directly. The Rocket database leak Dragos reported in Q2 showed the same instinct, with operators repurposing data stolen from one victim to compromise related organizations. For industrial organizations, this could turn service providers holding their data into a second point of exposure.
Akira
Akira fell out of the top three for the first time in more than a year, claiming 52 industrial victims in Q3, down from 129 in Q2. Dragos has not identified a law enforcement action, rebrand, or infrastructure disruption that explains the decline, and the group continued posting victims into October 2026. In an August 2026 intrusion documented by Huntress, an Akira operator gained access via a password spray targeting a SonicWall SSL VPN account without MFA, exfiltrated file-share data to cloud storage, and registered AnyDesk to run in Safe Mode. The operator then rebooted the host into Safe Mode with Networking, which took both the EDR agent and Microsoft Defender offline before the encryptor launched. The encryptor failed in that case, but the data was already exfiltrated for double extortion. Dragos assesses with low confidence that the drop reflects reduced affiliate activity and that Akira retains the capability to return to its prior volume.
Cl0p
Cl0p returned to Dragos’ DLS tracking in Q3 with 35 claimed victims, after claiming none in Q2. The return followed the previous tactics Cl0p has used against Accellion FTA, GoAnywhere MFT, MOVEit Transfer, Cleo, and Oracle E-Business Suite. The group favors mass exploitation of a pre-authentication flaw in enterprise software that concentrates high-value data, followed by data theft and email-based extortion without encryption. In this quarter, the target was product lifecycle management (PLM) software. PTC disclosed CVE-2026-12569, a critical deserialization vulnerability in Windchill and FlexPLM, on 17 June 2026, and cybersecurity and infrastructure security agency (CISA) added it to the known exploited vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on 25 June. Ransom-ISAC assessed that zero-day exploitation likely began in early June, with operators chaining the flaw with a separate pre-authentication information disclosure in the FlexPLM WSDL (Web Services Description Language) endpoint to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution. Beginning on 20 July 2026, victims received extortion emails with the subject line “Windchill PDMLink module serious data leak,” sent from compromised accounts to hundreds of employees at each organization. In August, ReliaQuest analyzed a custom implant built specifically for Windchill that decrypts LDAP and administrator credentials from the application keystore, enumerates the file vault, and can load follow-on payloads in memory. ReliaQuest assessed the activity as highly likely Cl0p. By mid-August, Cl0p had named more than 40 victims of the campaign on its leak site (35 of which were industrial organizations). Cl0p’s Q3 industrial claims included Shell, GE, Philips, Ingersoll Rand, Zebra Technologies, and Largan Precision, with claimed datasets including engineering drawings, blueprints, facility testing reports, and project files. Dragos has not independently verified these claims, and Philips stated that the activity was confined to a single enterprise server, with no impact on customer environments. PLM platforms such as Windchill hold product designs, bills of materials, supplier records, and engineering documentation for manufacturers in aerospace, automotive, heavy machinery, and oil & gas. Dragos assesses with moderate confidence that this campaign poses risks beyond the immediate victims, since stolen engineering data can provide an adversary with detailed knowledge of the equipment, facilities, and suppliers that downstream industrial customers depend on. The keystore credentials stolen by Cl0p’s implant also give an adversary a path from a single application into enterprise identity systems. Dragos has not observed any operational impact or OT compromise associated with this campaign, nor any intent by Cl0p to perform follow-on compromises.
Ransomware Driven by Geopolitical Events
The largest ransomware ecosystems continue to operate in jurisdictions where enforcement against adversaries targeting foreign entities is minimal or politically constrained, and victim distribution skews toward regions with adversarial relations with an affiliate’s home country. In late July 2026, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service and its partner agencies issued a joint advisory titled Operation Double Barrel, describing technical links they identified between a North Korean state-sponsored group and the Gunra ransomware operation. Public reporting attributed the state-sponsored activity to the Lazarus Group. Both operations exploited the same zero-day vulnerabilities in two South Korean financial security software products, delivered through the same watering-hole page, and shared malware, an SSH key fingerprint, command-and-control servers, and reverse-tunneling infrastructure. The state-linked group used its access to install espionage backdoors at more than 70 South Korean organizations, while Gunra used the same access methods for encryption and extortion. Findings published by AhnLab did not determine the exact relationship, assessing that the two may have shared techniques, tools, and infrastructure or collaborated to a limited extent. Gunra emerged in April 2025, built on leaked Conti source code, and launched a RaaS affiliate program in January 2026. U.S. and South Korea’s National Cyber Security Center issued a joint advisory on the group in August 2026, warning of attacks targeting government, critical infrastructure, and manufacturing organizations by exploiting Fortinet vulnerabilities and weak VPN credentials. Dragos tracked seven Gunra industrial victims in Q3, including a South Korean manufacturer of hydraulic pipe for heavy equipment, a Thai chemical manufacturer, and a Honduran pump and motor engineering firm. Public reporting indicates groups associated with North Korea have worked alongside ransomware operations before. Andariel collaborated with Play ransomware in 2024, Moonstone Sleet deployed Qilin in 2025, and Lazarus-linked operators deployed Medusa against U.S. and Middle Eastern targets in early 2026.
Rapid Exploitation of Edge Devices and Enterprise Applications
Internet-facing edge devices remained a consistent technical entry point into industrial and industrial-adjacent networks in Q3 2026, and the timeframe between public disclosure and ransomware exploitation continued to narrow. Two critical flaws in enterprise infrastructure software went from disclosure to confirmed exploitation in under two weeks, and CISA flagged both as used in ransomware campaigns within two months of disclosure.
CVE-2026-63077, JetBrains TeamCity. JetBrains disclosed and patched CVE-2026-63077, a CVSS 9.8 deserialization flaw allowing unauthenticated remote code execution on all on-premises TeamCity versions, on 27 July 2026. CISA added it to KEV on 05 August, nine days later, and Rapid7 published analysis and a public proof-of-concept on 07 August. On 23 September, CISA updated the KEV entry to indicate known use in ransomware campaigns. No ransomware group has been publicly named. Shadowserver tracked roughly 700 exposed vulnerable servers shortly after the patch, falling to just over 160 by late September. JetBrains TeamCity is commonly deployed in enterprise IT and DevOps environments, and in industrial settings, it often sits in the IT/OT DMZ or corporate network to build firmware, engineering configurations, and application packages that later reach plant systems.
CVE-2026-59310, VMware vCenter. Broadcom patched CVE-2026-59310, a CVSS 9.8 directory traversal flaw in the vCenter Syslog service that allows unauthenticated remote code execution, on 29 July 2026. Exploitation began five days later, on 03 August. QUIRSO tracked 361 victim IP addresses across 47 countries and assessed with moderate confidence that the initial exploitation came from a Chinese-speaking intrusion set. In at least one case, the same intrusion ended with Babuk-derived ransomware encrypting ESXi datastores after the operator pivoted from vCenter to every ESXi host in the environment. CISA added the flaw to KEV on 18 August and flagged it for ransomware use over the weekend of 13 September. vCenter controls the hypervisors that, in many industrial environments, host historians, HMI servers, engineering workstations, and other systems that support OT operations, so an adversary who compromises vCenter can reach the systems that support OT operations.
INC Ransom and SonicWall SMA 1000. In July 2026, SonicWall disclosed two vulnerabilities in its Secure Mobile Access (SMA) 1000 series appliances: CVE-2026-15409 (CVSS 10.0), a pre-authentication bypass in the /wsproxy component, and CVE-2026- 15410 (CVSS 7.2), a path traversal that grants root access. Volexity identified zero-day exploitation of the chain beginning on or before 22 June 2026 by a cluster it tracks as UTA0533. SonicWall patched both flaws on 14 July, and CISA added them to KEV the same day. After disclosure, Rapid7 and Resecurity reported INC Ransom as the dominant adversary exploiting the chain, and INC’s leak site listed new victims in Australia, the U.S., the UAE, Colombia, and Switzerland between 17 July and 01 August. INC operators also phoned victims directly to increase pressure during negotiations. In total, INC Ransom claimed 58 industrial victims in Q3, the third most of any group, across construction, ICS engineering, industrial equipment manufacturing, and government. The exact number of intrusions linked to SonicWall appliances is unknown.
FortiBleed credential theft. The FortiBleed campaign in June 2026 harvested working credentials for 86,644 Fortinet FortiGate devices across 194 countries. Fortinet attributed the compromises to credential reuse from earlier incidents and to brute-force attacks against devices without MFA; no single CVE is associated with the campaign. After gaining access, the operators used a custom Go tool, FortigateSniffer, which abuses the FortiOS packet sniffer to capture credentials across 24 protocols. They cracked captured hashes on a GPU cluster and created new firewall administrator accounts, in some cases deleting the victim’s own accounts and locking defenders out of their firewalls. In July 2026, SOCRadar linked some FortiBleed activity to INC Ransom and Lynx after an operational security failure exposed an operator logged in to both groups’ negotiation panels, and reported at least 12 resulting ransomware deployments. In Dragos’ DLS data, INC Ransom rose from 50 to 58 industrial claims, while Lynx fell from 21 to one industrial victim. The FBI and U.S. Secret Service warned in October 2026 that the campaign remains active.
Separately, in August 2026, Dragos reported activities consistent with pre-ransomware staging by a suspected cybercrime operation. Dragos-tracked Temporary Activity Thread (TAT)26-60 conducted artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted intrusions against at least eight organizations across the natural gas distribution, financial services, IT services, and industrial manufacturing and distribution sectors worldwide. TAT26-60 used Claude Code as an interactive assistant to conduct much of this activity, directing it to execute commands, develop tooling, and enumerate victim environments after gaining access through internet-facing Fortinet and SonicWall SSL VPN appliances. TAT26-60 used administrator credentials and AI assistance to compromise multiple edge and VPN appliances with limited operator interaction. During an attempt to establish persistent access on a gas utility’s compromised FortiGate device, Claude initiated an incorrect configuration restore, rendering the perimeter firewall unresponsive and disrupting site connectivity. Dragos assesses with moderate confidence that FortiBleed functions as an initial access pipeline serving INC Ransom, Lynx, and possibly other ransomware brands. Lynx is widely assessed as an evolution of INC’s codebase, which was offered for sale in 2024, so overlap between the two brands is expected. No matter the attribution, firewall credentials harvested at scale give ransomware operators a way into industrial networks long after the original compromise. Industrial organizations running FortiGate appliances should rotate administrator and VPN credentials, enforce MFA, and audit for administrator accounts they did not create.
FairLife
Date: July 2026
Impact: Production suspended at all four Fairlife facilities in the U.S. for roughly 11 days, from the 16 July disclosure until most production resumed on 27 July. Canadian operations were not affected, and retail supply held up on existing inventory.
Overview: Coca-Cola disclosed in a 16 July SEC filing that an unauthorized third party accessed a portion of its Fairlife dairy subsidiary’s systems, including production-related systems, in a ransomware event. The Anubis RaaS group claimed responsibility for the attack, stating it had encrypted Fairlife servers and stolen up to 1 TB of data, and Coca-Cola confirmed that data was taken. The company has not disclosed the initial access vector and does not expect a material financial impact.
Boston Scientific
Date: August 2026
Impact: Global disruption to manufacturing, order processing, and shipping for about two weeks. By 07 September, major distribution centers were shipping at or above normal levels and manufacturing had resumed at most facilities, and the company expects a material impact on its Q3 and full-year 2026 results.
Overview: Boston Scientific identified unauthorized activity on 25 August 2026 that caused a network outage across part of its on-premises IT environment, cutting access to the business applications it needs to manufacture products and process and ship orders. CrowdStrike’s investigation found the adversary entered through an external-facing network management device and identified no evidence of data encryption or of interactive access to manufacturing, maintenance, or SCADA systems. Boston Scientific has not attributed the incident to ransomware, and no group has publicly claimed it.
Oleoductos del Valle (Oldelval)
Date: July 2026
Impact: Administrative systems affected; crude oil transport continued without interruption, and the company reported no operational downtime.
Overview: Oldelval operates Argentina’s main crude oil pipeline network, carrying the majority of oil produced in Vaca Muerta. The Gentlemen listed Oldelval on its leak site on 23 July 2026 and threatened to release stolen data. On 31 July, Oldelval reported the incident to Argentina’s securities regulator (CNV), stating the attack affected only administrative systems, all of which it restored after activating its cybersecurity protocols. Oldelval has not disclosed the type of threat or the initial access vector.
In Q3 2026, ransomware activity impacting industrial organizations increased in every region compared to Q2, reinforcing the global and persistent nature of the threat. North America remained the most impacted region by a wide margin, while Europe and Asia also saw increased activity compared to Q1 & Q2.
Regional Distribution
North America: Recorded 566 incidents in Q3 2026 (up from 514 in Q2 2026), maintaining its position as the most impacted region. The U.S. alone accounted for 473 incidents in Q3, or 37% of all incidents worldwide. Activity was driven by sustained targeting of industrial organizations across the manufacturing sector, accounting for over 60% of incidents.
Europe: Reported 328 incidents (up from 316), remaining the second-most impacted region. Growth slowed from 64 additional incidents in Q2 to 12 in Q3. Germany stayed the second-most impacted country worldwide with 66 incidents (68 in Q2), 74% of them in manufacturing. Italy (48), France (38), Spain (35), and the UK (33) followed. The Czech Republic rose from 3 incidents to 12.
Asia: Documented 195 incidents, the region’s third consecutive quarterly increase (137, 172, then 195). India (38) overtook Taiwan (29) as the most impacted country in the region. Indian victims were concentrated in industrial equipment (10), automotive (5), and electronics (4) manufacturing, and The Gentlemen (10) and Krybit (6) claimed the most. South Korea nearly doubled (8 to 15), while Thailand fell from 29 to 16.
South America: Experienced 82 incidents (up from 64), the largest percentage increase among the major regions (28%). Brazil (22), Peru (16), Argentina (16), and Colombia (11) accounted for most of the activity.
Middle East: Recorded 53 incidents (up from 44), returning to its Q1 level (54). Turkey (20) led the region, followed by the UAE (8), Saudi Arabia (5), and Israel (5, none in Q2). Egypt fell from 12 to 4.
ANZ region: Observed 23 incidents, up from 19 in both Q1 and Q2. Australia accounted for 20.
Africa: Recorded 19 incidents (up from 11), matching Q1. South Africa rose from 1 incident to 8. Victims were spread across 10 countries, consistent with opportunistic targeting.
Ransomware activity in Q3 2026 continued to significantly impact industrial organizations, reinforcing adversaries’ sustained focus on sectors with tight operational dependencies and low tolerance for downtime. Manufacturing remained the most heavily targeted sector by a wide margin, while transportation and ICS equipment and engineering providers continued to experience persistent activity, ranking as the second- and third-most-impacted sectors, respectively. Energy-related sectors, including Oil and Gas and electric utilities/renewables, also remained consistently targeted throughout the quarter.
Manufacturing
Manufacturing was the most heavily impacted sector in Q3 2026, with 876 claimed victim organizations spanning a wide range of subsectors. Its share of all industrial incidents has risen every quarter this year: 62% in Q1, 65% in Q2, and 69% in Q3. Construction-related manufacturing and equipment were repeatedly targeted, consistent with their reliance on ERP systems, distributed locations, and tight project timelines. Food and beverage manufacturing increased for the third straight quarter (57, 70, then 90), and pharmaceutical manufacturing has more than doubled since Q1 (19 to 46). Conversely, metals fell from 44 incidents in Q1 to 13 in Q3.
Breakdown of Manufacturing Subsectors:
- Construction: 193 incidents
- Equipment: 184 incidents
- Food and Beverage: 90 incidents
- Electronic: 67 incidents
- Automotive: 53 incidents
- Pharma: 46 incidents
- Consumer: 42 incidents
- Healthcare: 35 incidents
- Chemical and Textile: 24 incidents each
- Plastics (18), Printing (17), Aerospace (13), Metals (13), and Recycling (12)
- Glass, packaging, semiconductor, defense, maritime, paper, and rubber: 10 or fewer incidents each
Industrial Control System (ICS) Ecosystem
Organizations directly supporting OT environments, including engineering services, integrators, and ICS equipment manufacturers, experienced 116 ransomware incidents in Q3 2026, nearly identical to Q2 (117). ICS engineering firms rose slightly, while ICS equipment manufacturers recorded their lowest count of the year.
Breakdown of ICS Subsectors:
- ICS Equipment: 21 incidents
- ICS Engineering: 95 incidents
Transportation and Logistics
These organizations remain attractive targets due to their dependence on scheduling platforms, reservation systems, fleet management software, and time-sensitive operations. Disruption in these sectors often creates immediate cascading effects well beyond the victim organization itself. Within the 105 transportation-related incidents observed in Q3, activity was distributed across the following subsectors.
Breakdown of Transportation Subsectors:
- Logistics: 77 incidents
- Maritime: 15 incidents
- Aviation: 13 incidents
- Rail: 0 incidents
Government, Energy, and Utilities
Government entities accounted for 47, largely at the municipal and regional level.
Electric utilities (7 incidents) and water utilities (4 incidents) continued to appear in ransomware victim disclosures, although at lower volumes than manufacturing and transportation.
Oil and Natural Gas (ONG) experienced 47 incidents, demonstrating persistent targeting of upstream, midstream, and downstream energy organizations and the service providers that support them. Renewable energy organizations (10 incidents) and mining organizations (19 incidents) were also impacted, indicating continued adversary interest in energy production and resource extraction environments.
Manufacturing was the most heavily impacted sector in Q3 2026, with 876 claimed victim organizations spanning a wide range of subsectors. Its share of all industrial incidents has risen every quarter this year: 62% in Q1, 65% in Q2, and 69% in Q3. Construction-related manufacturing and equipment were repeatedly targeted, consistent with their reliance on ERP systems, distributed locations, and tight project timelines. Food and beverage manufacturing increased for the third straight quarter (57, 70, then 90), and pharmaceutical manufacturing has more than doubled since Q1 (19 to 46). Conversely, metals fell from 44 incidents in Q1 to 13 in Q3.
Breakdown of Manufacturing Subsectors:
- Construction: 193 incidents
- Equipment: 184 incidents
- Food and Beverage: 90 incidents
- Electronic: 67 incidents
- Automotive: 53 incidents
- Pharma: 46 incidents
- Consumer: 42 incidents
- Healthcare: 35 incidents
- Chemical and Textile: 24 incidents each
- Plastics (18), Printing (17), Aerospace (13), Metals (13), and Recycling (12)
- Glass, packaging, semiconductor, defense, maritime, paper, and rubber: 10 or fewer incidents each
Industrial Control System (ICS) Ecosystem
Organizations directly supporting OT environments, including engineering services, integrators, and ICS equipment manufacturers, experienced 116 ransomware incidents in Q3 2026, nearly identical to Q2 (117). ICS engineering firms rose slightly, while ICS equipment manufacturers recorded their lowest count of the year.
Breakdown of ICS Subsectors:
- ICS Equipment: 21 incidents
- ICS Engineering: 95 incidents
Transportation and Logistics
These organizations remain attractive targets due to their dependence on scheduling platforms, reservation systems, fleet management software, and time-sensitive operations. Disruption in these sectors often creates immediate cascading effects well beyond the victim organization itself. Within the 105 transportation-related incidents observed in Q3, activity was distributed across the following subsectors.
Breakdown of Transportation Subsectors:
- Logistics: 77 incidents
- Maritime: 15 incidents
- Aviation: 13 incidents
- Rail: 0 incidents
Government, Energy, and Utilities
Government entities accounted for 47, largely at the municipal and regional level.
Electric utilities (7 incidents) and water utilities (4 incidents) continued to appear in ransomware victim disclosures, although at lower volumes than manufacturing and transportation.
Oil and Natural Gas (ONG) experienced 47 incidents, demonstrating persistent targeting of upstream, midstream, and downstream energy organizations and the service providers that support them. Renewable energy organizations (10 incidents) and mining organizations (19 incidents) were also impacted, indicating continued adversary interest in energy production and resource extraction environments.
Dragos’ analysis of Q3 2026 activity shows continued concentration among a small number of established RaaS operations, alongside persistent turnover among smaller and newly appearing brands. The two most active groups, Qilin and The Gentlemen, claimed the greatest number of industrial victims in Q3. Qilin and Akira have consistently ranked as the top operations impacting industrial organizations since March 2025, with Akira falling from the second to fourth spot for the first time in over a year.
- Qilin: 195 Q3 claims (140 in Q2). The most active group against industrial organizations for the sixth straight quarter, up 39% from Q2 2026. Targeting of manufacturing and supply chain-dependent environments continued. Construction, industrial equipment, and food and beverage manufacturers made up 84 of its victims. North America accounted for 86 victims, 66 of them in the U.S.
- The Gentlemen: 167 Q3 claims (125 in Q2). Third straight quarterly increase, up from 18 claims in Q4 2025. Victims were split between Europe (54) and North America (50), with the U.S. (39), Italy (12), and India (10) among the top countries. Public reporting ties the group’s initial access to FortiGate edge devices.
- Inc Ransom: 58 Q3 claims (50 in Q2). Moved from sixth to third. Broad targeting across manufacturing, ICS engineering/equipment, and government continued, with 19 U.S. victims.
- Akira: 52 Q3 claims (129 in Q2). Down 60%, ending more than a year as the number two group behind Qilin. Access via VPN device compromise has been the group’s primary entry point. Targeting narrowed to North America, which held 40 of its 52 victims (37 in the U.S.).
- Krybit: 43 Q3 claims (20 in Q2). More than doubled from Q2. The most Asia-focused of the top groups, with 17 of 43 victims in Asia, led by India (6). Three of its victims were also claimed by another group, two of them by The Gentlemen.
- DragonForce: 38 Q3 claims (76 in Q2). Volume fell by half. Victims spread across North America (14) and Asia (11).
- Cl0p: 35 Q3 claims (0 in Q2). Returned after claiming no industrial victims in Q2. Since 2023, Cl0p’s activity has fluctuated as the group focuses on encryption-less extortion campaigns that exploit newly disclosed vulnerabilities for data theft. Q3 activity can be linked to PTC Windchill & FlexPLM vulnerability exploitation.
- Safepay: 35 (36 in Q2). Consistent numbers across Q2 and Q3. Germany accounted for 13 of its 35 industrial victims.
- Storm: 33 (0 in Q2). New this quarter and heavily focused on North America, with 22 U.S. and 5 Canadian victims. Construction was its most targeted subsector (7).
- Settra: 28 (13 in Q2). More than doubled. Telecommunications was its top subsector (4), and 16 of 28 victims were in North America.
- Play: 25 (22 in Q2). Steady volume. Construction and ICS engineering firms accounted for 11 of the 25 victims, and 17 were in North America.
- LockBit 5.0: 24 (62 in Q2). Down 61%. Activity has continued since late 2025 despite 2024–2025 law enforcement disruptions. Half of its Q3 victims were in Europe.
- Chaos: 20 (17 in Q2). The primary operation is a financially motivated RaaS (construction, oil and gas, manufacturing in North America). The Chaos name was also used during an Iranian state-aligned false-flag activity in Q2 2026. Nineteen of its 20 Q3 victims were in North America.
- Other new entrants: Orova (19), Global Secret Group (19), Dark Project (18), Metaencryptor (15), Panzer (15), and Emperador (13), each with 0 in Q2. None of these groups claimed industrial victims in Q2. Newcomers pushed the count of distinct brands claiming industrial victims from 70 to 99. Dark Project’s 18 victims were all in North America, while Orova split between the U.S. (10) and Taiwan (6).
- Notable declines/exits: Deadlock: 9 in Q3 (45 in Q2). Its Q2 total came mostly from one bulk disclosure (33 of 45 claims in a single week), so the drop reflects disclosure timing more than a collapse in tempo. Lynx fell from 21 claims to 1, and Stormous posted no industrial victims after 15 in Q2. Ralord, mid-rebrand to “Nova” in Q2, fell to 6 claims in Q3.
Risk to industrial organizations in Q3 2026 continued to come from adversaries’ focus on the enterprise IT systems that underpin OT environments, with ransomware operators again causing disruption without any ICS-specific capability. ERP systems, virtualization infrastructure, identity services, and remote access gateways are high-value targets because disrupting them cascades quickly into production shutdowns and supply chain impacts. Internet-facing edge devices and enterprise applications remained the dominant entry points into industrial and industrial-adjacent networks, and the time between vulnerability disclosure and exploitation continued to narrow. Organizations should assume that all internet-facing assets are discoverable and actively sought by adversaries, making continuous external attack surface management a necessity. Consistent abuse of compromised credentials and remote management tools, including SimpleHelp, AnyDesk, and QuickAssist, reinforces the need for credential hygiene, MFA on all remote access, rapid patching of edge devices, and strict RMM tooling policies.
- How Exploitation of CVE-2026-0257 Leads to Qilin Ransomware – Arctic Wolf
- Inside Qilin Ransomware – Flashpoint
- 21 Months, $100 Million, One Qilin Suspect in Custody – Barracuda
- No Manners Here: The Ruthless Rise of The Gentlemen Ransomware – Unit 42
- Q3 2026 Sets New Record for Ransomware Attacks – Infosecurity Magazine
- Akira Hits Safe Mode: Ransomware Rebooting Around EDR – Huntress
- Remote Code Execution Vulnerability in PTC’s Windchill and FlexPLM Solutions – PTC
- CISA Adds Two Known Exploited Vulnerabilities to Catalog – CISA
- Cl0p Exploitation of PTC Windchill & FlexPLM (CVE-2026-12569) – Ransom-ISAC
- Clop Ransomware Targets Windchill, FlexPLM in Data Theft Attacks – BleepingComputer
- Clop Returns with Custom Implant in Mass-Extortion Campaign – ReliaQuest
- Cl0p Ransomware Group Names Over 40 Victims of PTC Windchill Campaign – SecurityWeek
- Philips and GE Investigating Clop Ransomware Data Theft Claims – BleepingComputer
- A Chill in the Air: Cl0p Targets Windchill, Another Enterprise Software Product – Censys
- Operation Double Barrel (The Relationship Between a State-Sponsored Threat Actor and the Gunra Ransomware Group) – AhnLab ASEC
- North Korea’s Lazarus Group Sharing Tools with Ransomware Hackers, South Korean Agencies Warn – The Record
- US and South Korea Warn of Gunra Ransomware Targeting Govt Agencies – BleepingComputer
- North Korean Hackers Seen Collaborating with Play Ransomware Group, Researchers Say – The Record
- Moonstone Sleet Shifts Tactics, Deploys Qilin Ransomware – Field Effect
- North Korean State Hackers Seen Using Medusa Ransomware in Attacks on US, Middle East – The Record
- CISA Adds Two Known Exploited Vulnerabilities to Catalog (CVE-2026-63077) – CISA
- Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in JetBrains TeamCity (CVE-2026-63077) – Rapid7
- CISA: Ransomware Gangs Now Exploiting Critical TeamCity Flaw – BleepingComputer
- VMware ESX, vCenter, Workstation, and Fusion Updates Address Multiple Vulnerabilities – Broadcom
- vCenter Flaw Exploited Just Five Days After Disclosure – Infosecurity Magazine
- Global Exploitation of CVE-2026-59310 by Suspected Chinese-Nexus APT & Related CVE-2026-59309 Activity – QUIRSO
- CISA: Critical VMware RCE Flaw Now Exploited by Ransomware Gangs – BleepingComputer
- From WSProxy to Root: INC Ransomware and SonicWall SMA Exploit Chain – Resecurity
- Proxying to Compromise: SonicWall Secure Mobile Access 0-day Exploitation – Volexity
- Recent SonicWall Vulnerabilities Exploited in Ransomware Attacks – SecurityWeek
- Rapid7 MDR Team Discovers New SonicWall SMA1000 Zero Days being Actively Exploited (CVE-2026-15409, CVE-2026-15410) – Rapid7
- INC Ransomware is Calling Victims: Pressure Tactics Post SonicWall Zero-Day Exploit – Security Affairs
- FortiBleed: SOCRadar’s Investigation into 86,644 Compromised Fortinet Firewalls – SOCRadar
- Analysis of Reported Credential Compromise of FortiGate Devices – Fortinet
- SOCRadar Links FortiBleed Campaign to INC and Lynx Ransomware Operations – SOCRadar
- FortiBleed Operations Continue Targeting Exposed Systems Leading to Reports of Lockouts – FBI
- Lynx Ransomware: A Rebranding of INC Ransomware – Unit 42
- Coca-Cola Restores Fairlife Production after Ransomware Attack – Food Dive
- Coca-Cola Suspended Production at its Fairlife Dairy After a Ransomware Attack – TechCrunch
- Form 8-K, Item 1.05 Material Cybersecurity Incidents (8 September 2026) – Boston Scientific
- Update on the August 25 cybersecurity incident – Boston Scientific
- Oldelval informó un ciberataque que no afectó el transporte de crudo – Vaca Muerta News
- TheGentlemen Ransomware Group Strikes Oldelval Oleoductos del Valle – DeXpose
- Help on the Line: How a Microsoft Teams Support Call Led to Compromise – Microsoft